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Government justifies its intervention in credit markets by
claiming that markets fail due to high transaction costs and
asymmetry of information. Such intervention programs include
special loan programs, government-funded wholesale credit and
credit guarantee schemes. The liberalization of commercial banking
in the 1990s, especially branch banking, diminished the need for
government to lend directly to target enterprise groups. Land Bank
of the Philippines and Development Bank of the Philippines,
government banks that have not been privatized, implement the
wholesale credit programs of the government. These government
development finance institutions administer credit guarantees to
target beneficiaries through financial institutions. Except for
contingent credit facilities to large corporate clients, a private credit
guarantee market does not exist. Government credit guarantee
institutions assist small-scale enterprises and other high-risk credit
markets that are targets of government development policy. Because
the government subsidizes guarantee institutions to support
beneficiaries with such adverse characteristics, it stands to benefit
from a better understanding of the economic advantages of credit
guarantees through reforms in credit guarantee policies and delivery
systems.
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Deriving the economic value of a credit guarantee to creditors is
the focus of this article. It is an important question because credit
guarantees do not work unless creditors derive economic benefits
from accessing those guarantees in the first place. This article shows
that understanding the prerequisites for the economic value of
guarantees to creditors could help the government design incentive-
compatible guarantee policies and measure the gross social economic
benefits of credit guarantee programs. Current research has not
offered a clear and operational concept of the private economic
benefits of credit guarantee, a requirement that can help government
estimate its social benefits. There is also a need to develop better
methods of assessing credit guarantee programs. In the end, a better
tmderstanding of the economic value of a credit guarantee and the
development of improved assessment methodologies can help
policymakers formulate, implement and evaluate credit guarantee
programs.
REVIEW OF PRIOR STUDIES
Prior studies assume that credit guarantees have economic values
because they address imperfections in the financial market, such as
credits to rural and small-scale enterprises (SSE). Llanto (1989)
identified factors or imperfections that impede lending to SSEs,
namely: the inability of banks to understand the borrowers' projects
and the high transaction costs for marginal borrowers. His study
found rural financial markets as highly segmented with banks
operating like a cartel in small market areas. In response to problems
of market imperfections and the relative market power of banks,
Philippine monetary authorities began to liberalize the banking
system in 1985. Magno and Meyer (1998) found that government
intervention through credit guarantee complements the
liberalization of the financial sector. Credit guarantees encourage
banks to increase their loans to small-scale enterprises and to
agricultural enterprises. However, their study did not analyze howSALDAI_A :CREDIT GUARANTEES] 29
credit guarantees affect the credit decisions of banks. The
Agricultural Credit and Policy Council (ACPC) saw credit
guarantees as a way of encouraging private banks to extend credits
to agricultural enterprises, a sector that banks considered as high-
risk (ACPC 1991). It envisioned credit guarantees as a substitute for
the collateral requirements of banks. Another study cited the need
for credit guarantees to support three types of loans, namely: (a)
those with insufficient collateral, (b) those of borrowers with
insufficient credit experience and (c) for start-up projects (Esguerra
1988).
Meyer (1992) made a significant comment regarding the focus
of assessment of loan programs and their impact on beneficiaries.
He noted that donor institutions supporting such loan programs
find difficulties in measuring the impact on the final beneficiaries.
Consequently, he pointed out that a currently accepted method is to
assume a positive impact if the beneficiaries access the loan program,
fully repay and repeat the transaction cycle. The interesting
implication of such an approach is that it measures the impact of a
credit program from the viewpoint of the creditor rather than the
beneficiary. The ACPC's review of credit guarantee programs in 1990
found these programs expensive and ineffective at stimulating loans
to new borrowers in target groups (Llanto et al. 1991). Another review
by the Credit Policy Improvement Program (CPIP) in 1997 similarly
found that credit programs were highly subsidized and ineffective
at generating loans to new borrowers.
A study by Orbeta et al. (1998) assessed three loan guarantee
programs by reviewing the financial and other performance
indicators of the guarantee institutions and programs as well as the
perceptions/motivations of program participants. They found that
the loan guarantees' reach is too small while existing guarantee
programs are heavily subsidized. Their study provides a framework
for identifying the intended social and private benefits of a guarantee
program. The social benefits refer to new loans made on the strength
of a guarantee while the private benefit is the reduction in risk of30 [ JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
the creditor. It concluded that private benefits are small compared
to the high social costs of an inefficient and subsidized delivery
system. The study further concluded that increasing the reach of
guarantee programs under current institutional arrangements is not
sustainable. This conclusion heightens the need to further study the
economic benefits of a guarantee program to creditors and to
guarantors. So long as private economic benefits are present,
government can respond to the call of the Orbeta et al. (1998) study
for sustainability by developing appropriate strategies to accelerate
the growth of new loans to target groups and by restructuring
implementing institutions to eliminate/reduce subsidies.
Levitsky and Prasad (1987) reviewed credit guarantee schemes
in 10 developed and 18 developing countries worldwide. Their
review covered the objectives, operations and assessment of the
"additionality" and delivery costs of credit guarantee programs.
They reported that the successful ones like the US, the UK and
Korean schemes generated "additionality" but required large
subsidies for either administrative costs (US and Korea) or adverse
risks relative to premim-n revenues (UK). interestingly, limitations
in impact and the presence of subsidies persist even in the US where
a favorable environment exists in terms of available inexpensive
credit information, reliable financial reporting by companies,
experienced bank credit evaluators and a large pool of SSEs in diverse
industries. Eliminating the administrative layer to reduce subsidies
may not be the simple answer either. For example, in the UK, a unit
at the Department of Industry with only two to three staff,
administers the guarantee scheme in a system where banks perform
all loan evaluations and guarantees are automatically granted upon
approval of the loan. The involvement of government institutions
at both ends of guarantee transactions does not invalidate the success
of a guarantee program. Levitsky and Prasad (1987) noted that by
all accounts, Korea's guarantee program has been a success even
when its guarantees were made mainly to loans by three
government-owned banks. Overall, the 28-country study suggestsSALDAlqA: CREDIT GUARANTEES[ 31
that because guarantee institutions are expected to fulfill inherently
social goals, the more important consideration is the degree of success
of these institutions in reaching out to target groups and in creating
new loan opportunities.
In sum, prior studies assume that credit market imperfections
justify credit guarantees but further study is needed to analyze how
they work. There is a need to understand how guarantees benefit a
creditor and its importance in a creditor's decision. Various studies
conclude that current credit guarantee programs are heavily
subsidized and have weak impact on their target groups. However,
these studies did not consider that when government mandates
guarantee institutions to serve target groups, it typically expects to
incur subsidies. The key question is whether the program generated
sufficient benefits to justify the (inevitable) subsidies. Past
evaluations of guarantee programs have not recommended reform
strategies for improving reach and for institutional restructuring that
could minimize subsidies. 1This article addresses these gaps by
defining the private economic benefits, recommending key reforms
in the screening policy of credits and empirically assessing the
potential gross economic benefits of a credit guarantee program.
ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF A CREDIT GUARANTEE
Creditors evaluate business loans based on the borrower's
reputation and capacity to pay. The capacity to pay depends on
whether the borrower uses the credit profitably. Being mere suppliers
of funds, creditors could not competently assess the risk of the
borrower's project in the presence of market imperfections like high
cost of gathering information, small borrowers and unfamiliarity of
1For example, the study of Orbeta et al (1998) recommended an audit of the three guarantee
institutions "to document the extent to which future guarantee claims and loan losses are
actually booked (sic). The results of these audits could then be used by the Secretary of Finance
to make decisions about the future of such schemes. That decision may involve liquidating
the guarantee programs and redeploying the remaining assets to other efforts that have a
more positive impact on poverty reduction" (page 27).32 ] JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
creditor with the borrower's business. Creditors would then be
unwilling to extend credits unless the borrower submits a collateral
or guarantee. Agency theory, as defined by Jensen and Meckling
(1976), is applicable in creditor-borrower relationships where a
borrower acts as an agent of the creditor (principal) in investing the
funds and must repay the loan while a creditor aims only to get full
repayment of its principal and interest. Since a borrower knows more
about its business than its creditor, it has an incentive to undertake
risky projects. When risky projects succeed, the creditor only gets a
fixed return while the borrower claims the residual. But when risky
projects fail, a borrower loses its fixed capital and passes on residual
losses to the creditor. The consequences of agency problem are a
tendency for excessive borrowing by firms and a tendency for a
creditor to extend less than the optimal level of loans. The adverse
incentive that creditors face in such agency contracts is called the
moral hazard problem.
To address the moral hazard problem, creditors monitor the
borrower's activities, require collateral and impose loan covenants
that provide them rights similar to those of equity holders in case of
default. If the business fails and causes the borrower to default, the
creditor liquidates the collateral. Thus, collateral helps creditors
minimize the moral hazard problem by making loan repayment
independent of business performance. A guarantee substitutes for
a collateral because a guarantor pays the loan in case the borrower
defaults regardless of the borrower's business performance.
However, a moral hazard problem likewise exists in guarantee
contracts. A guarantor does not know the borrower and relies on
the creditor to evaluate the borrower's credit worthiness. The
creditor, being the beneficiary of the guarantee, does not have an
incentive to be a diligent evaluator. This agency problem that is
inherent in all insurance (or guarantee) contracts is the economic
rationale behind the guarantor's requirement of a "deductible" to
share the risk with the creditor. An optimal guarantee contract partly
exposes a creditor to loan default risks and induces it to exercise
care when evaluating a borrower.SALDAiKIA :CREDIT GUARANTEES I 33
Creditors have a central role in the credit guarantee process. As
conduits of guarantees to target beneficiaries, they assume the
primary risk of the loan. A guarantee program could not be effective
unless it generates an economic incentive for the creditor to lend to
target borrower groups and to take the guarantee. The goal of a sound
credit guarantee program design is to adopt program
implementation policies that align the economic incentives of the
guarantor and the creditor so that they simultaneously achieve their
respective social and private objectives. In agency theory, policies
that achieve such alignment of interest are called incentive
compa tib]e policies.
The total economic value of a credit guarantee is equal to the
sum of the improvement in the respective welfares of the guarantor,
the creditor and the borrower. The guarantor's welfare function is
equal to actual revenues less the costs of administering the guarantee
program. The guarantor controls the viability of its guarantee
operations by: (a) adjusting the premium; (b) choosing the level of
guarantee risks; and (c) controlling costs. Similarly, the borrower
includes an explicit cost of the guarantee in its analysis of the project's
viability. The benefits and costs to the creditor are not as explicit
and need further analysis.
A creditor's loss function depends on the loan amount, L, and
collateral value, C, and is defined as:
(1) W--L-C
Loan default causes a creditor to call the guarantee. Default is
an uncertain event with a probability distribution. To simplify the
analysis, assume that there are only two events: either the loan is
fully paid (by the borrower or in case of default, from sale of collateral
with value that equals the loan amount) or the borrower defaults
with no collateral. For simplicity, assume a Bernoulli distribution
for these two events with probability p > 0 for full loss and probability
(1- p) for full payment. Under these assumptions, the expected value34 I JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
and variance of a creditor's loss function in equation (1),
respectively, are:
(2) E(W) =p(L-C)
Var (W) = (1 -p) pL 2+ (1 - p) (-p L)2
A creditor's welfare without the guarantee is represented by the
loss function Wc in Figure 1. Suppose a creditor accesses a credit
guarantee and takes additional collateral. Following current practice,
suppose further that the guarantee contract requires the guarantor
and the creditor to share claims on the collateral according to their
relative risks. The question is whether this guarantee scheme
improves a creditor's welfare. Under a guarantee contract, a
guarantor pays, in the event of default, an amount equal to a fixed
percentage of the loan. The creditor absorbs a loss equal to the
deductible. The loss function of a creditor with a credit guaranteG
with a deductible denoted as d, is:
(3) Wg=d(L-C) where0<d<l
Algebraic and graphical methods facilitate the derivation of
necessary and sufficient conditions for a guarantee to improve a
creditor's welfare, and thus, to have economic value. With a
Bernoulli distribution for the loan events, the expected value and
risk as measured by the variance of the creditor's loss are,
respectively:
(4) E(W_) = pdL
Var (Wg) -- p(dL) 2(1 - p)2 + (1 - p) (pL) 2
A creditor's welfare .improves if either its expected loss or
variance of loss is higher without the guarantee, than with a
guarantee. This statement is defined in algebraic terms as follows:SALDAI_IA :CREDIT GUARANTEESI 35
(Sa) AE(Wc.g) = E(W,)- E(W_) > 0 and
(Sb) aVar (W g)=-Var (W,) - Var (Wg) > 0
with a requirement for strict inequality in either equation if one were
to show strict Pareto improvement.
Deducting equation (4) from equation (2) yields a strict inequality
in both equations:
(6a) AE(W_._) = (1 - d) pL > 0
(6b) AVar (W___) = (1 - d) [(1 - p2) pL2+ (1 - p) p_L_]> 0
The results show that a guarantee improves the creditor's welfare
because it simultaneously reduces both the expected amount and
risk of loan loss. Equation (6a) states that the economic benefit of a
guarantee is the expected value of the guaranteed portion of the
loan. The expected net benefit is equal to this amount less the
guarantee fee and any transaction costs. 2 Equation (6b) states that a
guarantee decreases the risk of the creditor, defined as the variance
of loss. A creditor that wants to reduce risk while at least maintaining
expected profits will strictly prefer to accept a guarantee contract
for its loan.
A graphical analysis examines the loss functions with and
without guarantee to reveal the sources of a guarantee's economic
value. The change in creditor's welfare due to the guarantee is
represented by the difference in equations (1) and (3):
(7) AW,._ =Wc-Wg
._ =(1-d)(L-C)>0 ifC<L
2 In practice, a creditor usually passes on the cost of the guarantee to the borrower,¢D
Table 1. Loan and collateral values by type of financial institution (GFSME, December 31, 1991) _*
Colla teral-to-loan '-"o
Average ratio Loan Average Value Collateral per loan collateral-
loan size of Collateral to-loan ,._
Financial Number Total (thousand) (thousand) Mean S.D. ratio Mean S.D. _ institution (FI) (thousand) (thousand) (thousand) (percent) (percent)
t-_
Commercial Bank 141 321,752.5 2,281.9 366,235.5 2,597.4 2,977.7 113.8 134.9 135.3 _
Private Dev't. Bank 119 186,593.3 1,568.0 208,200.3 1,749.6 1,438.4 111.6 120.9 99.3 _
Rural Bank 28 25,747.0 919.5 22_396.9 799.9 1,012.6 87.0 82.8 48.0 Z ,-.-1
Special Gov't. Bank 128 300,195.0 2,345.3 98,177.9 767.0 1,577.7 32.7 4(?.6 53.9
Nongov't.
Organization 65 41,915.8 644.9 4,111.1 63.2 370.1 9.8 8.5 35.8
481 876,203.6 1,821.6 699,121.7 1,453.5 2,155.9 79.8 86.0 106.0SALDANA:CREDIT GUARANTEES ] 41
These types of banks tend to be more risk-averse and they expect
the high cost of liquidating foreclosed collateral. SGBs and NGOs
have low collateral-to-loan ratios indicating a higher degree of
tolerance for risk and less reliance on collateralP
The previous analysis raises two empirical questions, namely,
do FIs differ in the way they manage their risk through guarantee
and collateral requirements and does a guarantee create new credit
opportunities (the so-called "additionality")? The first question was
addressed by regressing collateral against loan size as an
independent variable and FI type as a dummy. The regression model
follows observed practice by creditors of requiring collateral
depending on their risk management policy and loan amount. The
regression results are shown in Table 2.
The highly significant overall F-statistic and coefficient of
determination indicate that the regression explains most of the
variations in collateral requirements of FIs. The t-statistics for all
dummy variables for FI type are likewise significant, suggesting that
FI types differed in their risk management policy¢ The coefficients
of loan amount and dummy variables are of the expected signs and
are statistically significant. Collateral is positively related to loan
amount and dummies for KB and PDB, indicating that these two FI
types require higher collateral as a matter of policy. Collateral is
negatively related to the dummies for NGO and SGB, associating
these two FIs with lower collateral requirements. These statistical
A more precise estimate of the average relationship between collateral and loans was obtained
by regressing collateral against loans for each FI type with the regression constant forced to
zero. All regression equations had highly significant overall F-statistics and R2. Interpreting
the coefficients of the loan value as the statistical estimate of the collateral-to-loan policy of
each FI type, KBs and PDBs came out as requiring higher levels of collateral compared to
SGBs and NGOs. The results of the regression are summarized in terms of their coefficients
of loans with parenthetical notes on t-statistics and overall E as follows: KB: 1.05 (22.2, 494),
PDB: 1.01 (22.9, 535), SGB: 0.15 (5.1, 26.5), NGO; 0,13 (3.2, 10.1) and RB: 0.88 (10.3, 106).
The regression excluded the dummy variable for rural banks, the FI group with the least
number of loans, to avoid multi-collinearity.
variable: FI type.42 [ JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
results support the hypothesis that risk-management policies
differed across FI types. 7
The second empirical question concerns the "additionality" of a
guarantee. "Additionality" is the amount of loan that a creditor has
in its portfolio that it would have rejected were it not for the
guarantee. However, this benefit is not observable because the event
did not happen. The results of previous economic value analysis
suggest that the total amount of collateral-free and collateral-deficient
loans is an appropriate estimate of the upper limit of the incremental
loan opportunity generated by the guarantee "additionality'. An
analysis of collateral levels of FI loans is shown in Table 3.
Guaranteed collateral-free loans amounted to about P183.5 million
or 21 percent of all FI loans. Among the different FIs, NGOs and
Table 2. Factors explaining differences in collateral requirements among types of
financial institution (FI)
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Overall Adjusted
F R
0.36
Loan Amount 0.3579 12.101"* 55.8**
Dummy 1: Commercial 1,309,867 3.658**
bank (KB)
Dummy 2: Private 717,576 1.984'*
development bank (PDB)
Dummy 3: Nongovernment -638,324 -1.642"
organization (NGO)
Dummy 4: Special government -543,205 -1.504
bank (SGB)
Constant 470,751 1.443
* Significant at 0,10 **Significant at 0_001
7It is assumed that the regression captures the factor, risk management policy, in the variable:
FI type.SALDAIqIA :CREDIT GUARANTEESI 43
SGBs have the highest collateral-free loans in proportion to their
total loans. Total guaranteed loans that are partly covered by
collateral amounted to about P272.5 million or 31 percent of all FI
loans. The overall average collateral-to-loan ratio for collateral-free
and deficient loans was 23 percent. Altogether, total collateral-short
loans amounted to about P454 million or 52 percent of all FI loans.
This result is consistent with the findings in Orbeta et al. that the
actual impact of guaranteed programs in terms of reach to target
borrowers is only a subset of the total guarantee portfolio of these
institutions. Only about half of the actual guaranteed loans of GFSME
in 1991 generated economic benefits to Fis and these benefits were
concentrated in SGBs and NGOs. The limited impact could also be
because of inadequate safeguards in determining whether or not
loans would have been made without the guarantee and in
preventing any attempt by FIs to obtain guarantees for loans to non-
target groups.
The differences in risk management policies of FIs are evident
in their patterns of collateral-to-loan ratios as shown in Figure 3.
NGOs and SGBs stood out because collateral-free and collateral
deficient loans comprised 85 and 94 percent of their loans,
respectively. These FIs relied on GFSME's guarantee to manage their
credit risks and accounted for more than 60 percent of total benefits. 8
The relative importance of SGBs and NGOs suggest that under
current guarantee program structures, institutional mandates, more
than market incentives, drive access to credit guarantees. KBs and
PDBs required more collateral and had larger loans than other FI
types. KBs were willing to give collateral-free terms for small loans
averaging P1.6 million but required more collateral for larger loans,
8An issue can be raised regarding the policy of guaranteeing NGOs because many NGOs are
not sustainable institutions. Similarly, the welfare effects may get obscured if government
institutions guarantee loans of government banks. As earlier noted, Levitsky and Prasad
reported that Korea's guarantee scheme is a success although guaranteed loans are made by
government banks. Nevertheless, guarantee transactions between government guarantee
institutions and SGBs may not be markeborien ted considering that the government subsidizes
and directs the operations of both institutions.44 [ JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table 3. Analysis of collateral levels of guaranteed loans, by type of financial institution
(GFSME, December 31, 1991)
Collateral-free loans Collateral-deficient loans Total collateral-deficient or
deficient loana
Financialinstitution Amount(inmillion %of Amount (in %of Collate Amount (in %of Collateral-
(FI) pesos) Total million pesos) Total ral-to- million pesos) Total to-loan
for foreach loan foreach ratio
each FI ratio FI
Total Average FI Total Average Total Average
Commercialbank 27.7 1.6 8.6 71.1 3.7 22.7 73.0% 98.9 2.7 31.3 38.5%
Private dev't, bank 1.7 1.7 0.9 41.6 1.7 22.3 51.5% 43.3 1.4 23.2 42.9%
Rural bank 4.1 1.0 15.9 7.2 0.8 27,9 55.9% 11.3 0.9 43.8 3K7%
Special gov't bank 119.5 1.0 39.8 142.0 2,6 47.3 46.3% 261.5 2.4 87.1 23.0%
Nongov'f.
organization 30,5 0.5 72.8 8.8 1.8 20.9 11.3% 39.3 0-6 93.7 0.9%
183.5 13 272.5 2.4 51.0% 454,4 1.8 23.0°/,,
Percent to total all
FIs 20-9 31.1 52,0
e.g., those averaging P3.5 million. The total collateral-free and
collateral-deficient loans of KBs and PDBs amounted to only 31 and
23 percent of their respective loan balances but still accounted for
about a third of total "additionality." This finding suggests that
although traditionally risk averse, collateral-oriented FIs can
contribute to a program provided that the guarantee institution has
an appropriate screening policy.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This article analyzes how a credit guarantee confers private
benefits to creditors and proposes reform policies and related
assessment measures in order to make a credit guarantee a socially
beneficial intermediation instrument. To encourage prudent
lending, a guarantor requires a creditor to accept a co-insurance
clause called a deductible. To the extent that it requires a collateral
on top of a guarantee, a creditor transfers part of its deductible
risk to the borrower. The analysis establishes that the necessary
and sufficient conditions for credit guarantee to have a positiveSALDAIC, IA: CREDIT GUARANTEES ] 45
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Figure 3. Patterns of collateral-to-loan requirement by type of financial institution (GFSME,
December 31, 1991)
economic value to a creditor are: a) insufficient collateral to cover
loan loss and b) a creditor's risk aversion. A credit guarantee has a
positive economic value to a risk-averse creditor if and only if, it
bears part of the risk of loan loss. Thus, the recommended policy
that shall be incentive-compatible to both guarantor and creditor
is to require that the guaranteed loan be either collateral-free or
collateral-deficient. Such policy aligns the private economic benefits
of a creditor with the intended social economic benefits of a credit
guarantee.
The economic value analysis suggests two hypotheses for
empirical testing: (a) Conduit Effect Hypothesis." do differences in
risk management policies of FIs influence the impact of guarantee
program, and (b) "Additionality" Hypothesis. does a guarantee
program expand the loan opportunities of borrowers in target
groups. An analysis of GFSME-guaranteed loans in 1991 indicated
that FIs significantly differed in terms of their risk management
policy as measured by apparent collateral requirements. KBs and46 I JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
PDBs require higher average collateral-to-asset ratios than SGBs
and NGOs. About half of GFSME's portfolio in 1991 can be
considered as the upper limit of the estimated "additionality"
generated by the guarantee program. SGBs and NGOs accounted
for about 60 percent, while KBs and PDBs contributed about 30
percent, of the benefits. These findings suggest that guarantee
programs have a limited reach, implying a need for continuing
subsidies. The government should then institute radical
institutional restructuring and other policy reforms to increase
reach and reduce subsidies.
There are several implications for government guarantee
institutions and policymakers. First, guarantee institutions should
use the FIs' collateral requirement and risk management policy as
criteria for targeting and screening their participation. This implies
that guarantees should only be granted to loans with less than 100
percent collateral coverage. Second, the guarantee institutions
should strengthen their review and approval policy and procedures
to ensure that guarantees are given to loans that would not have
been made due to collateral deficiency. Third, to expand reach to
target borrowers, guarantee institutions should seek the
participation of FIs that want to use guarantees to manage their
lending risks. The study's findings indicate that guarantee
institutions should cast a broad net because even collateral-oriented
Fis like KBs and PDBs grant collateral-deficient loans and can
substantially contribute to program benefits. Fourth, to reduce
subsidies, government should consider restructuring the guarantee
institutions from the present system of individual guaranty
approvals to wholesale guarantee operations. This would minimize
the number of staff required to oversee guarantee operations. This
shift shall require the guarantee institution to focus on strengthening
the implementation guidelines to assure "additionality" and to
allow most loan evaluation tasks to be performed by FIs. Fifth,
policymakers should adopt a more liberal definition of
"additionality" to encompass both collateral-free and collateral-SALDAI_A : CREDIT GUARANTEES ] 47
deficient loans. For these types of loans, creditors derive economic
value from a guarantee and borrowers value the guarantee enough
to pay the guarantee fee.
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